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ARGUMENT
James Brockbank submits this Answer Brief in response to Penny Brockbank's
cross appeal. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in its valuation of "Brockbank
Appraisal Service" (hereafter BAS). Penny Brockbank is not entitled to attorney fees on
appeal.
L

PENNY BROCKBANK'S FAILURE TO MARSHAL THE
EVIDENCE REGARDING GOODWILL, REPUTATION,
AND PROFESSIONAL LICENSE SHOULD PRECLUDE
HER FROM CHALLENGING THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING
ON APPEAL.

Penny Brockbank should be prevented from challenging the trial court's findings
on appeal because she failed to marshal the evidence. "In order to challenge a trial
court's finding of fact on Appeal, the challenger must marshal all the evidence in support
of the finding and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient to support the
findings in question." Marshall v. Marshall, 915 P.2d 508, 516 (Utah App.
1996)(citations omitted). Penny Brockbank did not marshal the evidence in support of
the trial court's finding. She failed to marshal the evidence presented in David R.
Anderson's report regarding goodwill and reputation (Mr. Anderson's conclusions
regarding goodwill and reputation are listed in argument II) . Penny Brockbank only
restated the portions of Mr. Anderson's testimony and report which she believed
supported her position, but ignored the portions which supported the court's findings.
The Court of Appeals has stated that when a party fails to marshal the evidence, the trial
court's findings will not be disturbed on appeal. Marshall at 516. Therefore, the finding
1

that only BAS's fixed assets were subject to marital division should stand on appeal.

H.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN VALUING BROCKBANK APPRAISAL SERVICE (BAS)
BECAUSE THE GOODWILL, REPUTATION, AND
PROFESSIONAL LICENSE OF JAMES BROCKBANK IS
NOT A MARITAL ASSET SUBJECT TO DIVISION.

Penny Brockbank argued that the trial court abused its discretion in valuing BAS
at $17,115. (Appellee's Brief 23-27.) Penny Brockbank argued that the entire fair
market value of BAS was subject to marital division, rather than only the $17,115 value
of BAS's fixed assets. (Appellee's Brief 23-27.) James Brockbank disagrees. The
goodwill, reputation, and professional license of James Brockbank is not a marital asset
subject to division.
The evidence at trial showed that except for BAS's fixed assets, the value of BAS
was dependent upon the goodwill, reputation and professional license of James
Brockbank. The only evidence regarding the valuation of BAS was the testimony and
report (Exhibit 14) of David R. Anderson. In his report, David R. Anderson made several
significant conclusions:
The business [BAS] is dependent on the personal services ofMr.
James Brockbank who is licensed by the State of Utah and has
received various professional certifications appropriate to the
recognition of his experience and education in the residential and
commercial real estate fields. (Exhibit 14-page l)(emphasis added.)
While Mr. Brockbank has employed various individuals to assist
with assorted functions of the appraisal process, his personal review
and interface is critical with each appraisal job the business
2

undertakes. The personal role Mr. Brockbank plays in the
completion of each appraisal is essential in determining the ultimate
marketability of the business. (Exhibit 14-page l)(emphasis added.)
A service business generally does not require a relatively significant
investment in capital assets. The assets are generally restricted to
office furniture andfixtures, vehicles, electronic equipment and
office facilities. (Exhibit 14-page l)(emphasis added.)
Mr. James Brockbank has developed the current business [BASJ into
what it is today by his personal involvement. His personal
reputation in the industry, his business contacts, his established
relationships with lenders and the real estate industry have led to the
success the business enjoys today. (Exhibit 14—page 2)(emphasis
added.)
In addition to his report, David R. Anderson's testimony at trial also provided
significant information about BAS and James Brockbank. When asked during redirect
examination whether the value of BAS was dependent entirely on James Brockbank's
reputation, David R. Anderson answered that the value of BAS was "significantly"
dependent upon James Brockbank's reputation. (R. at 313-page 155.) Penny Brockbank
argued that David R. Anderson had a limited ability to evaluate goodwill. However,
when David Anderson was asked whether he had moved beyond his ability, he answered
"we are still in the realm of what my opinion is regarding Mr. Brockbank's role in
determining fair market value . . . . " (R. at 313—page 155.)
The law regarding the division of goodwill and reputation is clear. "[Ujnless the
professional retires and his practice is sold, his reputation should not be treated
differently from a professional degree or an advanced degree . . . .We held in
Gardner...

that advanced degrees were not marital property which could be valued and
3

then divided between the spouses. The reputation of a sole practitioner is personal, as is
a professional degree." Sorensen v. Sorensen, 839 P.2d 774, 776 (Utah 1992)(citing
Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1078 (Utah 1988)). "It would not be equitable to
[divide] the value ascribed to the goodwill, because the goodwill of a sole practitioner is
nothing more than his or her reputation for competency...." Sorensen at 775.
In this case, James Brockbank is not selling BAS. Therefore, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion when it refused to divide the assets of BAS that were dependent upon
James Brockbank's goodwill and reputation.
Penny Brockbank argued that James Brockbank5 s appraiser licence was not a
"professional license" or an "advanced degree." Penny Brockbank argued that only
medical doctors, lawyers or advanced degrees such as an MBA rise to the level of
professional license or advanced degree. (Appellee's Brief 27.)

However, the law does

not support this proposition. In fact, even the case Penny Brockbank cites as authority for
her argument does not support her proposition. Penny Brockbank cited to Peterson v.
Peterson, 131 P.2d 237 (Utah App. 1987). Peterson states:
[A]n advanced degree is or confers an intangible right which,
because of its character, cannot properly be characterized as property
subject to division between the spouses. Id at 241.
Property can be bought, sold, and devised. Bona fide degrees
cannot be bought sold and devised. Bona fide degrees cannot be
bought; they are earned. They cannot be sold; they are personal to
the named recipient. Upon the death of the named recipient, the
certificate commemorating award of the degree might be passed
along and treasured as a family heirloom, but the recipient may not,
on the strength of that degree, practice law or medicine. Id at 240.
4

An appraiser license cannot be bought or sold. An appraiser license cannot be
devised. Only James Brockbank can perform appraisals on the strength of his license.
Therefore, James Brockbank's appraisal license is a bona fide license which cannot be
divided.
Penny Brockbank also stated that to become a "registered appraiser" only two
weeks of state schooling was required. (Brief of Appellee 27.) Apparently, Penny
Brockbank made this statement to imply that the ease of obtaining a registered appraiser
license removes it from the status of a "professional license" or "advanced degree."
However, this argument is irrelevant because James Brockbank is a "certified" appraiser.
"The process of certification is much more lengthy [than the process to become
registered]." (R. at 314-page 57-58.) It requires additional schooling, requires obtaining
a minimum number of points from performing many appraisals, and must be renewed
every two years. (R. at 314—page 57-58.) James Brockbank has spent a substantial
amount of time earning and renewing his certified appraiser licence.
The law regarding "professional license" and "advanced degree" is clear. "The
recipient of an advanced degree obtains that degree on the basis of his or her innate
personal talents, capabilities, and acquired skills and knowledge." Martinez v. Martinez^
818 P.2d 538, 541 (Utah 1991). "The time has long passed when a person's personal
attributes and talents were thought to be subject to monetary valuation

In short, we

do not recognize a property interest in personal characteristics of another person such as

5

intelligence, skill, judgment and temperament, however characterized." Martinez at 542.
Penny Brockbank gives the impression that if the entire fair market value of BAS
is not equally divided, James Brockbank will receive an unmerited bounty. However, this
is not true. Penny Brockbank is already receiving an equitable share of BAS's fair market
value. The income that James Brockbank receives because of his reputation, goodwill,
and professional license is already shared with Penny Brockbank in the form of alimony
and child support. Subjecting James Brockbank's goodwill, reputation, and professional
license to division would result in double counting for Penny Brockbank. See Sorensen
at 776.

m.

PENNY BROCKBANK IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY
FEES ON APPEAL.

Penny Brockbank is not entitled to attorney fees on appeal. Although Penny
Brockbank asserted that she was entitled to an award of attorney fees concerning this
appeal, she failed to state a reason. (Appellee's Brief 28.) Because Penny Brockbank has
failed to state a reason why the Court of Appeals should remand the case to assess
attorney fees concerning this appeal, Penny Brockbank's request should be denied.

6

CONCLUSION
Based upon the forgoing reasons, the Court of Appeals should affirm the trial
court's decision regarding the valuation of BAS and should deny Penny Brockbank's
unsupported claim for attomey fees. The Court of Appeals should reverse the trial
court's findings regarding James Brockbank's income for purposes of temporary debt
support and permanent support for the reasons stated in Appellant's Brief.
Dated this

/

day of October, 1998.

BRENT D. YOl^SfG (j
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that on this

7

day of October, 1998,1 caused to be mailed,

first-class mail, postage prepaid, the foregoing Answer Brief of Appellant to John E.
Schindler, Attorney for Penny Brockbank, at the following address:

John E. Schindler
80 West Main, Suite 201
Price, Utah 84501

BRENT D. Yi
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ADDENDUM
A.

Exhibit 14—David R. Anderson's Report.

B.

Testimony of David R. Anderson.

C.

Testimony regarding "appraiser certification."

D.

Sorensen v. Sorensen, 839 P.2d 774 (Utah 1992).

E.

Martinez v. Martinez, 818 P.2d 538 (Utah 1991).
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Sr
David R. Anderson
Certified Public Accountant
Personal Financial Specialist

(801) 637-9218
296 East 100 South
P.O. Box 4
Price, Utah 84501

February 15, 1996

Mr Brent D. Young
Attorney at Law
P O Box 657
Provo, Utah 84603
Re: Brockbank Appraisal Services
Dear Mr Young.
Based on our earlier conversations and your letter dated January 9, 1996,1 have evaluated
the appraisal business of Mr. James Brockbank know as "Brockbank Appraisal Services".
The evaluation of this business has been particularly difficult due to the lack of
accounting/ record keeping procedures and journals and the lack of appropriate
documentation. In addition, significant time delays have occurred between the time
various items were requested and the delivery of the requested items. This should not be
construed that Mr. Brockbank was not cooperative, Mr. Brockbank was very cooperative.
It seemed, however that Mr. Brockbank simply did not have possession of or access to
manyfinancialdocuments.
Upon you approval and release, I will forward copies of the enclosed report to Mr.
Schindler.
Upon your review of the enclosed, please feel free to contact me at any time if you require
additional clarification.
Sincerely,

David R. Anderson, CPA
DRA/ka
enc.
cc: Mr. James Brockbank

A-\
MEMBER: American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Personal Financial Planning Division (AICPA), Utah Association of Certified Public Accountants

BROCKBANK APPRAISAL SERVICE
February 15, 1996
1 - Mr. James Brockbank operates a sole proprietorship in the Carbon and Emery county
area of Utah known as Brockbank Appraisal Service. The business was formerly know as
Brockbank & Associates. The change in name occurred for reasons unrelated to the
operation of the business and the principal, Mr. James Brockbank has not changed. The
change in name did not and does not effect the value of the business.
Mr. Brockbank has operated the business in the referenced area in excess of 15 years
and the business is well established and well known throughout the area of operation. The
business provides real estate appraisal services to the general public throughout the area
with a primary concentration on residential real estate appraisal services. A significant
amount of income is derived from providing commercial real estate appraisal services. A
small portion of income is derived from miscellaneous ancillary services generally
associated with residential or commercial real estate valuation services.
2 - The business is dependent on the personal services of Mr. James Brockbank who is
licensed by the State of Utah and has received various professional certifications
appropriate to the recognition of his experience and education in the residential and
commercial real estate fields.
While Mr. Brockbank has employed various individuals to assist with assorted
functions of the appraisal process, his personal review and interface is critical with each
appraisal job the business undertakes. The personal role Mr. Brockbank plays in the
completion of each appraisal is essential in determining the ultimate marketability of the
business.
3 - The business is a service business which operates differently from a retail/resale or
manufacturing business. The income is primarily derivedfromthe personal services of one
or more individuals which generate a product which is generally of an informational nature
and not consumable.
The principal items which separate a service businessfromother types of businesses
are the lack of capital investment and the necessity of direct involvement of personnel in
thefinishedproduct. Business affiliations, reputation and training of principals and staff
are significant factors. A service business generally does not require a relatively significant
investment in capital assets. The assets are generally restricted to office furniture and
fixtures, vehicles, electronic equipment and office facilities.
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A - GROSS SALES / INCOME
Service businesses are generally transferred to a new owner in a complete (100%)
sale, at a value based on a number of factors. One factor that always an issue is the
concept of "Gross Sales". A simple formula may be 100% of annual gross sales plus
assets. This formula is fairly typical and consistent.
As a going concern, the business being transferred generates income based on the
past efforts of the previous owners. Prior owners have established business contacts,
community presence, established quality perceptions, acquired resources, staff, equipment
and facilities in a such a configuration as to promote continued success.
The variable which is the most difficult to determine is the effect the previous owner
has on a business as a continuing operation. When the principal who has developed,
molded and shaped the business into its current identity departs, the void left on the
continued operation is very real but extremely difficult to measure.
Mr. James Brockbank has developed the current business into what it is today by his
personal involvement. His personal reputation in the industry, his business contacts, his"
established relationships with lenders and the real estate industry have led to the successthe business enjoys today.
Should the current business be transferred without the continued involvement of Mr.
Brockbank, the marketability of the business is greatly reduced. New owners would be
required to establish their own individual identity and reputation in the appraisal
community. Obviously, some continued income would flow to the new owners based on
the established influence of Mr. Brockbank but would certainly diminish with time. The
income generated by the new owners would quickly be replaced with income based solely
on their individual business identity with the effect of Mr. Brockbank diminishing rapidly.
During the previous four years, Mr. Brockbank has enjoyed an arrangement with the
Carbon County Assessor's office to provide appraisal services to the County. During the
years 1992 through 1995, the County arrangement generated gross income in the amounts
of 530,098, $36,227, 541,104 and 523,263 respectively. The income for the year 1995
was generated for a period of approximately 6 months at which time the assessor's office
terminated the program, which in turn eliminated this source of income.

-2-
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The gross income (sales) of the business for the years 1994 and 1995 are as follows:

Gross Income
Less- Carbon County Income

12M
5154,596
( 41.104)

1295
$135,668
( 28.263)

Adjust Gross Income

SI 13,492

$107,405

Average Gross Income

Sl^Q.449

When examining the preceding discussion of Mr. Brockbank's personal involvement
in the generation of gross income and continued success of the business, the geographic
location of the business must be considered. The Carbon/Emery County area has
historically been isolated to a limited degree from the economic events, both up and down,
of the populous areas of Utah. The market has continued to support only_two fiill time
appraisal business^operations. Tne inability of this market to expand significantly is
bw - jorted by the lack of other appraisal businesses operating in this area on a full time
basis. Part time operations and occasional outside services have always shared the market
but continue to be a relatively insignificant competitive concern.
The combination of personal involvement by Mr. Brockbank and the geographic
market restrictions dictate a deep discounting in the evaluation of this type of business.
With the assumption that gross income is the basis for determining market value, it follows
that the gross income as a basis must be discounted for known restrictions on
marketability.
The amount of discount to apply to gross income for the purposes of determining
market value is at best an arbitrary effort. However, alternative information can provide
an insight into the discount rate. In the past few years, including 1995, closely held
business in the Carbon/Emery area which are being valued (fair market value) for estate
tax purposes receive discounts due the lack of marketability, lack of ease of transfer, role
the principal and founding owners have played, geographic conditions and general local
market economic conditions. The discount for estate tax purposes has been applied at 25
to 30 percent of the established market value. This discount has routinely been accepted
by the Internal Revenue Service indicating acceptance of the discount for fair market value
purposes.
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The conclusions which can be drawnfromthe preceding discussion would dictate a
discount is in order in this situation.
Average Gross Income (as adjusted)

S110,449

Discount 25%

( 27.612)

Discounted Average Gross Income

S 82,837

The assets used and owned by the business are relatively insignificant and the fair
market value is assumed by Mr. Brockbank to be as follows:
Equipment including
new computer equipment
Office furniture and
fixtures
Supplies
Total

$ 15,290
1,775
50.
S17.115

The FAIR MARKET VALUE of BROCKBANK APPRAISAL SERVICES is
estimated as follows:
Average Gross Sales
Marketability Discount
Assets

$110,449
( 27,612)
17115

Fair Market Value
(Gross Sales Approach)

S 99.952

B - BENEFITS TO OWNERS
An alternative approach of determining the fair market value of a business is to
determine the benefits to new owners. This approach, called the buyer's approach,
measures the benefits the business will provide to the new owner. Non cash benefits such
as personal expenses paid directly by the business and cash benefits received must be
combined and valued.

X-5

Using the analysisfromthe gross sales discussion, the conclusion is drawn that the
benefits to the new ownersfromthe efforts of the prior owner will continue to generate
benefits to the new owner over the short term with quickly diminishing returns. The
generally accepted perception is that by the end of the second year after a transfer of
ownership, the benefits derived by the new owners will be generated by their own efforts
and not by the prior management.
The non cash benefits of the business have not been determined. The records of the
business do not provide reliable documentation which will enable the non cash benefits to
be measured. The draws or cash with drawn by Mr. Brockbank for his personal accounts
for the years 1994 and 1995 are as follows:

Personal Draws
Carbon County Income

12M
$60,533
( 41,104^

1221
$79,881
(28.2<?3)

Net Draws

S19,429

551,618

Average Draws (adjusted)

535,524

Average Draws recoverable
for a 2 year period
571.048
The personal draws of Mr. Brockbank have been reduced by the amount of the
Carbon County income during the periods 1994 and 1995. The Carbon County draws,
while being available and used by the owner either in the business or personally, are not
applicable to new owners. Since the arrangement with Carbon County has terminated, the
Carbon County income would not be a reasonable inclusion in the amount future owners
could expect to receivefromthe income generated by the prior efforts of the previous
owner. It is assumed the benefits to the new ownerfromthe prior owners efforts would
continue for a maximum of two years. At the end of two years the lasting benefits to the
new owners would be extinguished.
Since the previous section on assets of the business has been discussed, the amount
would properly be included in the value of the business.
Average Draws for
a two year period
Assets '

571,048
17r115

Fair Market Value
(Owner1 Benefit Approach)

S88T163
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C - CONCLUSION
Based on the two approaches discussed and analysis involved, the fair market value of
Brockbank Appraisal Service is determined as follows:
Gross Income Approach
Benefit to Owner Approach

$99,952
88T163

Average

594,058

FAIR MARKET VALUE

S94.058

D - CONDITIONS
1 - Records: The records, journals and source documents of Brockbank Appraisal were
incomplete and commingled. Bank statements for the year 1994 were not available for the
three business accounts. The exception was the account at Carbon Credit Union which
Mr. Brockbank was able to obtain a transcript from Carbon Credit Union. The checkbook
registers were not footed but each entry has sufficient notation to draw conclusions
regarding the purpose of the disbursement. The Carbon Credit Union account did not
have a checkbook register but carbon copies of the checks were made available. Numbers
were missing on the Carbon Credit Union account providing an in complete checkbook
history The complete transcript of the Carbon Credit Union account enabled the carbon
copies and transcript combination to become a reliable source document. Every effort
was made to be complete and accurate in this evaluation.
2 - Income records: The income records of the company are maintained in a log which
appeared to be complete. The actual deposit record were not complete due to the factors
indicated in 1, above. The income log detailed each job, the job date, the job file
reference, the client, the property, the date the invoice was sent and the date the invoice
was paid. This record appeared to provide a great deal of accuracy with respect to the
income of the business.
3 - Assets: Assets of the business were not inspected, a summary of the assets was
provided by Mr. Brockbank with his estimate of the fair market value. The values
indicated appeared to be reasonable but no attempt was made to verify the values
provided.
4 - Cooperation: Mr. Brockbank was very cooperative but unable to obtain many records
requested. When possible, Mr. Brockbank obtained additional or supplemental
documentation from sources available.
-6-
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5 - Tax Returns: For the year 1994 and prior, the tax returns for the business were
included in the personal return of Mr. & Mrs. Brockbank by virtue of schedule C attached
to and incorporated into the personal income tax return. Any information extracted from
the 1994 income tax returns which were prepared by the accounting firm of Smuin and
Rich, CPA's was assumed to be correct and accurate.
6 - Audit: No attempt was made to audit, review or compile anyfinancialinformation of
the business in accordance with standards prescribed by the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants. This report must not be construed as representation of operating
results and should not be used by any parties not familiar with the inherent limitations of
this type of analysis. No opinion on the operating results of Brockbank Appraisal Services
is offer or intended. Thefinancialinformation presented is the representation of the
owners of Brockbank Appraisal Service.

David R. Anderson
Certified Public Accountant
Price, Utah
February 15, 1996
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154

Q.

If you were t o l e a r n today that he has

another a p p r a i s e r in h i s employ, and we assume then
t h a t they perform the same function of an a p p r a i s e r ,
does t h a t change your statement t h a t you write down
h e r e a f t e r paragraph 2 - - or paragraph marked 2 on
page 1, t h a t i t ' s dependent on the personal s e r v i c e s
of Mr. Brockbank?
A.

No, I don't t h i n k so.

Q.

So are you telling me, then, if he has 10

appraisers and they all do the work, and he simply
signs off on them because he has reviewed them all,
and he is the one that goes to the banks and talks
them into referring their business to him, and goes to
the various areas where his business may have some
influence or value, and sells his business to them,
and they refer their business to him and somebody else
does the work, that doesn't change your opinion about
that sentence?
A.
range.

I think your example is outside the relevant
I think if he had 10 appraisers I would want

to qualify my statement, but if I were to learn that
he had another certified appraiser working under his
(inaudible) it would not change my opinion.
Q.

About value.

A.

About value.

B-i
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Q.

But i t may change your opinion about t h a t

sentence, would i t not?
A.

I t h i n k so.

Q.

So what you're t e l l i n g u s , then, i s t h a t the

v a l u e of Brockbank Appraisal, in your view, i s
dependent e n t i r e l y on Mr. Brockbank's reputation
period?
A.

No, s i g n i f i c a n t l y , not e n t i r e l y .

Q.

The difference between s i g n i f i c a n t l y and

e n t i r e l y , then, i s that there may be somebody e l s e who
i s a q u a l i f i e d a p p r a i s e r with the same licenses t h a t
he has, same q u a l i f i c a t i o n s that he has, doing some of
t h a t work, producing some of that g r o s s income; i s
t h a t right?
A.
answer.

I d o n ' t think I can give t h a t a yes or no
I t h i n k I would have to answer that - - I

c a n ' t answer t h a t .
Q.

I'm n o t - -

Have we not, Dave, at t h i s point moved i n t o

t h e realm t h a t you feel may be beyond your c a p a b i l i t y
(inaudible) an a p p r a i s e r as opposed t o a CPA looking
a t records?
A.

I d o n ' t think so, I think we are s t i l l i n

t h e realm of what my opinion i s regarding Mr.
Brockbank's r o l e i n determining f a i r market value, as
I understand h i s business.

B-Z
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Q.

Well, his role is in the area of goodwill,

and that, you've already acknowledged, has a value if
we're appraising a business; is that a fair statement?
A.

That is a fair statement.

Q.

The value of the business known as Brockbank

Appraisals, then, if Mr. Brockbank were to vanish
today, and the product continued to be churned out in
the same regularity that it was in 1995, then your
opinion of the value of Brockbank Appraisals would be
the same; is that right?
In other words, what I'm saying is the value
of Brockbank Appraisal is dependent on the work that
comes into the business, and what you're telling me is
that in your view, that comes -- the business comes in
simply because it's Brockbank Appraisals; isn't that
right?
A.

To a significantly degree, yes.

Q.

So if the business, whatever name was

operating under, produced revenue at the amounts
indicated here, your opinion about the value of that
business would be the same, right?
A.

Given the existing configuration of

personnel and involvement of the same staff as it is
in the report, yes.
Q.

So your figures, then, have nothing to do
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employment?
A.

She has other employment, yes.

Q.

And then she -- I assume it's a she?

A.

Yes.

Q.

She works for you when you need her to do

things?
A.

Yes.

If I have say two appraisals that a

couple of lenders need or want done quickly or at the
same time, then I would use her -- that sort of thing.
Q.

And she is licensed to conduct appraisals;

is that correct?
A.

She's a registered appraiser.

Q.

What does it take to be registered?

A.

Two weeks of -- I think it's two weeks of

state -- schooling approved by the state, submission
of an application.

It's a very simple process to

become registered.
Q.

Is there a process called certification, or

what's the next step up?
A.
lengthy.

The process of certification is much more
It requires additional schooling, it

requires doing (inaudible) they call it attaining
points, you get so many points for certain kinds of
appraisals.

You are allowed a maximum number -- you

may do -- say the points that the state sets are 25
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points per month, and you do 50, you're only given the
25 points. The 50 is not carried over to the next
month.
Q.

Is there a certificate or something that you

A.

At the end of this more or less

get?

apprenticeship period, is really what it is, you are
required to take an examination.
Q.

Is it a state license thing?

A.

It is a state licensing exam, yes.

Q.

And you have to take this exam and obviously

A.

Yes.

Q.

Does i t require a yearly renewal?

A.

I b e l i e v e i t ' s renewed every two y e a r s .

Q.

To g e t on the l i s t t h a t Ms. Mower spoke of

pass?

t h a t you have t o be c e r t i f i e d ?

What's your

understanding?
A.

Registered appraisers can - - i f

registered

a p p r a i s e r s do a p p r a i s a l s t h a t the lender or the
underwriter f e e l s i s professional work, then they w i l l

signings by t h e c e r t i f i e d a p p r a i s e r .

They w i l l not

accept the r e g i s t e r e d a p p r a i s e r ' s a p p r a i s a l unless the
c e r t i f i e d a p p r a i s e r signs on i t .

C-2
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Elaine S. SORENSEN, Plaintiff,
Respondent, and CrossPetitioner,
v.
Clifford G. SORENSEN, Defendant,
Petitioner, and CrossRespondent
No. 890145.
Supreme Court of Utah.
March 30, 1992.
Rehearing Denied July 7, 1992.
Wife sued for divorce. The Second
District Court, Davis County, Rodney S.
Page, J., granted a divorce, divided marital
property, and awarded the wife attorney
fees. Husband appealed. The Court of
Appeals, 769 P.2d 820, affirmed in part and
reversed in part. Petition and cross petition for certiorari were granted. The Supreme Court, Howe, A.C.J., held that (1)
goodwill and reputation in the husband's
solo dental practice was not a marital asset
subject to equitable division where the husband continued his practice at the same
location after the divorce; (2) accounts receivable of the husband's practice were a
marital asset, but the husband was entitled
to an offset for accounts payable against
value of the receivables; (3) a stipulation
between the parties supported an order directing each party to pay half the fees of a
mutually acceptable appraiser, even if the
husband was obligated to pay more than
the statutory expert witness fee; and (4)
the evidence supported the award of attorney fees to the wife.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Stewart, J., concurred with opinion.
Durham, J., dissented in part with
opinion, in which Zimmerman, J., joined.
1. Divorce <*=>252.3(1)
Goodwill and reputation of husband's
solo dental practice was not marital asset
subject to equitable division where husband
continued in his practice at same location
after divorce; husband did not retire or sell
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his practice and, thus, did not realize any
amount over and above tangible assets of
his dental practice.
2. Divorce <s=*253(3)
Accounts receivable of husband's solo
dental practice could be included in value of
practice, for purposes of division of marital
property, even though proceeds represented deferred income from which husband
could pay child support and alimony; discounted value of accounts receivable were
includable as marital asset.
3. Divorce <s=>253(3)
In establishing value of accounts receivable of husband's solo dental practice,
for purposes of division of marital assets,
husband was entitled to offset accounts
payable against accounts receivable.
4. Divorce <3=>227(1)
Stipulation under which parties agreed
to have their real property appraised by
mutually acceptable appraiser permitted
trial court to require parties to share equally in payment of appraiser's fees, even if
amount for which husband was held liable
exceeded statutory witness fees; stipulation contemplated that trial court would
determine who was to pay for appraisal
based on equitable considerations. U.C.A.
1953, 21-5-4.
5. Divorce <£=>227(1)
Evidence was sufficient to support
award of $2,000 in attorney fees to wife,
representing one-half of requested fees; although husband's attorney refused to stipulate to reasonableness of requested fees,
stipulation indicated that wife's attorney, if
called, would testify that requested fees
were reasonable.
Kent M. Kasting, John D. Sheaffer, Salt
Lake City, for defendant
Reid E. Lewis, Jeffrey Robinson, Salt
Lake City, for plaintiff.

ON CERTIORARI TO THE UTAH
COURT OF APPEALS
HOWE, Associate Chief Justice.
We granted defendant's petition for certiorari to review a decision of the court of
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appeals that affirmed the trial court's (1)
valuation and distribution of defendant's
dental practice and (2) allocation of expert
witness fees between plaintiff and defendant in this divorce action. Sorensen v.
Sorensen, 769 P.2d 820 (Utah CLApp.1989).
We also granted plaintiffs cross-petition in
which she assails the court of appeals' (1)
reversal of the trial court's award of attorney fees to her and (2) denial of attorney
fees to her on appeal.
Plaintiff Elaine S. Sorensen and defendant Clifford G. Sorensen were married in
April 1975. Plaintiff sued for divorce in
March 1985. Four children had been born
to the parties, one of whom died after the
divorce decree was entered. The trial
court awarded custody of the children to
plaintiff and ordered defendant to pay child
support and alimony. As part of the property division, the court awarded defendant
his dental practice. In valuing that practice, the court found that "the large portion
of the value of the practice has to do with
goodwill and reputation built up in the
practice over the years of marriage." The
court relied on the opinion of plaintiffs
appraiser in arriving at a value of the practice. Other property of equal value was
awarded to plaintiff. Defendant was ordered to pay $2,000 toward plaintiffs attorney fees and one-half the fees of a real
estate appraiser selected by the parties.
Defendant appealed to the court of appeals. His principal contention was that
the trial court should not have included
goodwill and reputation in its valuation of
his dental practice. After reviewing the
cases and authorities on the subject, the
court of appeals affirmed the valuation and
affirmed the allocation of payment of the
expert's appraisal fees but reversed the
tnai court's award of $2,000 attorney fees
to plaintiff. She was also denied attorney
fees on appeal.
I. VALUATION OF DENTAL
PRACTICE
A. Goodwill and Reputation
[11 Defendant renews his objection to
the inclusion of goodwill in valuing his dental practice. The trial court valued the
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practice at $100,060, $62,560 of which represented the value of goodwill which depended upon defendant's retiring from his
practice and referring his patients to the
buyer. The balance consisted of furniture
and equipment ($15,330) and discounted accounts receivable ($22,170). In its findings
of fact, the trial court implicitly recognized
that the goodwill and reputation of Dr.
Sorensen were bound up together. In finding of fact No. 7, the court stated:
The defendant should be awarded the
dental practice including all equipment
and accounts receivable^] the Court feeling that the large portion of the value of
the practice has to do with goodwill and
reputation built up in the practice over
the years of marriage.
(Emphasis added.) In affirming the inclusion of goodwill, the court of appeals relied
on what it stated to be the rule in a majority of jurisdictions and also on dicta which it
found in our decision in Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1078 (Utah 1988).
However, in Gardner there were twentythree physicians in the Ogden Clinic. The
goodwill of the clinic did not rest on the
reputation of any one person as it does in
the case of a sole practitioner such as defendant In a clinic, practitioners may
come and go and the institution may have
goodwill separate and apart from any one
practitioner.
It may well be that if the sole practitioner retires at the time of a divorce and his or
her practice is actually sold and an amount
is realized over and above the value of the
tangible assets, the full amount should be
viewed as marital property. We leave that
issue for another day. In the instant case,
however, no actual sale took place, and
defendant continued in his practice ac the
same location following the divorce. It
would not be equitable to require him to
pay his wife part of the value ascribed to
the goodwill, because the goodwill of a sole
practitioner is nothing more than his or her
reputation for competency, as pointed out
in the dissenting opinion of Judge Jackson
in the court of appeals. Sorensen, 769
P.2d at 833; see also Prahinski v. Prahinski, 321 Md. 227, 582 A.2d 784 (1990). We
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the valuation of the professional corporarecognize that a professional reputation
can be valued and that it sometimes can be
tion's goodwill would have the effect of
sold together with the tangible assets of a
double counting, as earning capacity is
practice when the professional retires. We
also utilized in determining an appropribelieve, however, that unless the profesate alimony award. See, e.g., Olson v.
sional retires and his practice is sold, his
Olson, 704 P.2d 564, 566 (Utah 1985).
reputation should not be treated differently Sorensen, 769 P.2d at 829. We believe the
from a professional degree or an advanced court of appeals fell into the very trap it
degree: both simply enhance the earning warned against Plaintiffs appraiser valability of the holder.
ued defendant's goodwill and reputation
We held in Gardner and more recently in based on defendant's future earning capaciMartinez v. Martinez, 818 P.2d 538 (Utah ty, i.e., what would his practice produce in
1991), that advanced degrees were not mar- dollar amount during the next few years?
ital property which could be valued and The two cannot be separated; future earnthen divided between the spouses. The ing capacity comes in large part from goodreputation of a sole practitioner is personal, will and reputation. Holbrook, 103 Wis.2d
as is a professional degree. Both enhance at 350, 309 N.W.2d at 354. The trial court,
the professional's earning capacity. The too, made the same error when it recogcombination of the degree and the practi- nized that it could not and should not place
tioner's reputation enables him or her to a value on "the human resource of the
earn in many cases a substantial income, ability of each party to produce income"
the fruits of which are shared by the chil- but then placed a $62,560 value on defendren in the form of child support and by dant's goodwill and reputation:
the former spouse in the form of alimony.
The Court refused to set a dollar figThat is true in the instant case where deure
on the human resource of the ability
fendant has been ordered to pay substanof each party to produce income which
tial amounts of child support and alimony
may
have been acquired during the
which were determined in light of his earncourse
of the marriage. The Court speings from his dental practice. Requiring
cifically finds that such a determination
defendant to divide with his wife the value
is
too speculative in nature and no
of his reputation would not be an "equitaamount
of accounting gymnastics can
ble division/' which is required by our statgive to such a computation the degree of
ute, but would constitute "double countcredibility such that this Court would
ing," which is condemned in property divifeel
justified in setting a dollar figure;
sion cases. See Holbrook v. Holbrook, 103
however, said ability is taken into acWis.2d 327, 352, 309 N.W.2d 343, 355 (Ct
count by the Court in considering the
App.1981); In re Marriage of Nichols, 43
question of support and alimony.
ColoApp. 383, 386, 606 P.2d 1314, 1316
(Ct.App.1979) (Ruland, J., concurring).
The illogic and unfairness of treating
defendant's
reputation as a dentist as a
In affirming the trial court's inclusion of
goodwill and reputation in the valuation of marital asset and dividing its value is demthe dental practice, the court of appeals onstrated by the fact that during the marriage the parties invested substantial sums
warned:
We emphasize, however, one factor in plaintiffs education, which created an
that clearly should not be considered in intangible asset in the form of her inthe valuation of goodwill is the profes- creased earning capacity. She received a
sional spouse's future earning capacity. master's degree and only needs to complete
Consistent with our position that profes- her dissertation to get her doctorate; yet
sional degrees are not assets capable of that asset was not considered marital propdistribution, we similarly hold that the erty by the trial court. This disparate
future earning capacity of the divorcing treatment is illustrated by In re Marriage
professional should not be considered. of Hall, 103 Wash.2d 236, 692 P.2d 175
To consider future earning capacity in (1984). There, both husband and wife were
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medical doctors. The husband worked in a
clinic with two other doctors. His gross
yearly earnings exceeded $52,000. The
wife, a salaried professor at the University
of Washington, earned $42,000 per year.
She enjoyed a reputation as one of the top
ten physicians in the nation in the field of
pediatrics genetics. Numerous medical
schools across the nation had offered her
employment with salaries up to $60,000.
103 Wash.2d at 236-37, 692 P.2d at 176.
The trial court found, and the Supreme
Court of Washington affirmed, that the
husband had professional goodwill which
was a marital asset to be divided. The
wife was found to have no goodwill due to
the fact that she was a salaried physician.
103 Wash.2d at 242, 692 P.2d at 178.
We cannot justify drawing a distinction
between a party who holds an advanced
degree that enables him or her to command
a substantial salary and one who holds an
advanced degree but has chosen to be selfemployed and has earned a good reputation
for skill and competence. Several other
courts and judges have noted the lack of
any real difference between advanced degrees and the goodwill of a professional
sole practitioner. The Wisconsin Court of
Appeals in Holbrook v. Holbrook stated:
We are not persuaded that the concept
of professional goodwill as a divisible
marital asset should be adopted in Wisconsin. We are not obliged nor inclined
to follow the twisted and illogical path
that other jurisdictions have made in
dealing with this concept in the context
of divorce.
The concept of professional goodwill
evanesces when one attempts to distinguish it from future earning capacity.
Although a professional business's good
reputation, which is essentially what its
goodwill consists of, is certainly a thing
of value, we do not believe that it bestows on those who have an ownership
interest in the business, an actual, separate property interest. The reputation of
a law firm or some other professional
business is valuable to its individual owners to the extent that it assures continued substantial earnings in the future.
It cannot be separately sold or pledged
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by the individual owners. The goodwill
or reputation of such a business accrues
to the benefit of the owners only through
increased salary.
. . . Although we recognize the factual
distinction between a degreeholder and a
partner or shareholder in a law firm, we
think the similarities compel analogous
treatment in a divorce setting. In both
cases, the "assetf' involved is not salable
and has computable value to the individual only to the extent that it promises
increased future earnings.
103 Wis.2d at 350-51, 309 N.W.2d at 35455 (citation omitted).
Similarly, Judge Ruland, in a special concurring opinion, In re Marriage of Nichols,
43 Colo.App. 383, 386, 606 P.2d 1314, 1316
(1979), approved the trial court's observation: "[T]he going concern value [goodwill]
is peculiarly tied to the names and skills of
the Petitioner [husband]
The Respondent will share in this income by way of
maintenance, and to consider it in property
settlement would allow her double consideration of that value." Id. The Supreme
Court of Kansas in Powell v. Powell, 231
Kan. 456, 648 P.2d 218 (1982), reviewed
cases from other jurisdictions that dealt
with professional goodwill, noted the split
of authority on the subject, and agreed
with those jurisdictions that do not treat
professional goodwill as a marital asset to
be divided.
B. Accounts Receivable and Payable
[2] Defendant next contends that the
accounts receivable of his dental practice
should not have been included in the value
of his practice because they represent deferred income from which he must pay
child support and alimony. He relies upon
a statement in our opinion in Dogu v.
Dogu, 652 P.2d 1308 (Utah 1982). There,
we held that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion by awarding the defendant
physician the entire interest in his professional corporation of which he was the sole
shareholder. We stated that the corporation had accounts receivable that "represent deferred income" from which the de-
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fendant "may meet his ongoing alimony
and child support obligations," but did not
indicate whether an offsetting amount was
awarded to the plaintiff wife. Id. at 1309.
We now disavow any implication that an
accounts receivable cannot be valued and
counted as an asset, even though the proceeds may be used as any other asset to
pay future alimony or child support We
find no error in the trial court's including
the discounted value of the accounts receivable as a marital asset
[3] On the other side of the ledger of
defendant's dental practice were $10,129 in
accounts payable. Plaintiffs appraiser did
not subtract that amount as a liability in
arriving at his estimate of value. Instead,
he factored in the accounts payable in determining the value of the goodwill of the
practice. Since we have determined in part
IA of this opinion that no amount should
have been included for goodwill and reputation, upon remand the trial court is directed
to offset the accounts payable against the
accounts receivable.
II. EXPERT WITNESS FEES
[4] At a pretrial conference before the
divorce commissioner, the parties agreed to
have their real property appraised by a
mutually acceptable appraiser and stipulated that defendant would pay the appraiser, but "[a] final determination of responsibility for said expense [is] to be made by
the court." Alan Heiskanen was chosen as
the mutually acceptable appraiser, and he
testified for plaintiff on the first day of
trial. On the second day of trial, defendant
called a different appraiser as his witness,
apparently because defendant did not agree
with Mr. Heiskanen's appraisal. The trial
court ordered plaintiff and defendant to
divide the fees of Mr. Heiskanen equally.
The court of appeals affirmed that order,
as we now do. Defendant relies upon
Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771 (Utah
1980), and Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380
(Utah 1980), as authority for the proposition that he could not be held liable for
witness fees in excess of the statutory rate
1. The statute now provides for $17 per day. See
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of $14 per day,1 as provided in Utah Code
Ann. § 21-5-4.
A short answer to this contention is that
the parties' stipulation covered more than
the payment of "witness fees." At the
time the parties entered into the stipulation, Mr. Heiskanen's appraisal had not yet
been made and neither party knew whether
he or she would use him as a witness. It
appears to us that the intent of the parties
was to obtain an appraisal which would
provide helpful information to both parties,
without regard to whether the appraiser
would be called as a witness at the trial.
The stipulation contemplated that the trial
court would determine who should pay for
the appraisal based on equitable considerations without regard to the strictures of
the statute and case law regarding "witness fees" for testifying in court. It may
be true, as defendant points out, that part
of Mr. Heiskanen's fee included his testifying in court for plaintiff. However, there
is nothing in the record breaking down his
fee between his services in making the
appraisal and his later services in testifying
at trial for plaintiff. We find no abuse of
discretion by the trial court in requiring the
parties to equally share the payment of the
fees.
III. ATTORNEY FEES
[5] Plaintiff contends that the court of
appeals erred in reversing the trial court's
award of $2,000 in attorney fees. The basis of the reversal was insufficiency of
evidence as to the reasonableness of the
fees. The resolution of this issue involves
the interpretation of a stipulation between
the parties and accepted by the trial judge
on the first day of cnaL We interpret the
exchange between the two lawyers and the
judge as follows: Defendant's attorney refused to stipulate to the reasonableness of
the fee requested by plaintiff; however, he
stipulated that if called as a witness, plaintiffs attorney would state what his fee was
based on and would testify that the fee was
reasonable. The trial judge then restated
the stipulation as he understood it 'The
stipulation would not go to the question of
Utah Code Ann. § 21-5-4 (1991).
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whether or not they are reasonable or
whether they should be awarded, but that
reasonableness would be his testimony."
Defendant did not adduce any evidence regarding the reasonableness of the fee requested. Since we interpret the stipulation
to be that plaintiffs attorney, if called,
would testify that the requested fee was
reasonable, we conclude that the evidence
is sufficient to support the award of $2,000,
one-half of the requested fee. The award
to plaintiff is therefore reinstated.
Plaintiff further complains that the court
of appeals denied her attorney fees on appeal. Because we resolve the main issue
raised on appeal in favor of defendant, viz.,
the valuation of the dental practice, we find
no abuse of discretion in the denial. For
that reason, plaintiff is denied attorney
fees on this certiorari review.
IV. CONCLUSION
The part of the decree of divorce concerning property division is reversed, and
the case is remanded to the district court to
make an equitable division in accordance
with this decision and without regard to
any value of goodwill or reputation of defendant's dental practice. We affirm the
division of appraiser fee's, reinstate the
$2,000 award of attorney fees, and affirm
the denial of attorney fees on appeal to the
court of appeals. We also deny attorney
fees on this review.
HALL, CJ., concurs.
STEWART, Justice (Concurring):
I concur in the majority opinion except
for the statement that the accounts payable
should be offset against the accounts receivable. Whether the particular payables
w ~*-~
„_ w*J3c« spends
on the nature of each item. It may also be
necessary to determine whether the particular accounts have been double-counted in
determining defendant's income and the
value of the marital estate, as could occur
depending upon the nature of the accounting methods used. If one or another of the
items has been taken into account for one
such purpose, it should not be used a second time.
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In my view, the treatment of those accounts should be left to the trial judge.
DURHAM, Justice (Dissenting):
I respectfully dissent Defendant argues
that the goodwill of a solo professional
practice cannot be marital property. He
cites Jackson v. Caldwell, 415 P.2d 667
(Utah 1966), for the proposition that a professional practice does not have any goodwill value. Stripped of dicta, that case
stands for nothing more than that Jackson
failed to prove that his former accounting
partnership had any remaining goodwill for
which it was accountable to him. See id. at
671. In that case, we simply upheld the
factual findings of the district court
Defendant cites Dogu v. Dogu, 652 P.2d
1308 (Utah 1982), as reaffirming his view
of Jackson. Our decision in Dogu contains
no analysis of this issue, only a simple
statement, not referring to a trial court
finding, that Dr. Dogu's medical practice
had no "earning power" other than his
ability to work. Id. at 1309. There is no
mention of evidence about the value of the
practice other than receivables and cash on
hand, which were both accounted for in
offsets and alimony. We certainly did not
reject the concept of goodwill value in that
case.
Defendant asserts that language in
Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah
1988), noting that "[g]ood will is properly
subject to equitable distribution upon divorce," id. at 1080 n. 1, is dictum and that
the facts of Gardner distinguish it anyway. I do not agree. What appears to be
dictum in Gardner is intended to guide the
trial court on remand. Although the facts
of Gardner are different (D~ r*nmm~—~ -vis
part of the twenty-three-member Ogden
Clinic, while defendant is a sole practitioner), the distinctions do not make a difference here.
The real problem, and apparently a major
reason for the disagreement between the
majority and the dissent in the court of
appeals, lies with the term "goodwill."
The majority below went to some trouble to
explain why goodwill could be marital prop-
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erty subject to distribution, and the dissent
took them to task for "trying to create
'new property" in the context of marriage
dissolution." Sorensen v. Sorensen, 769
P.2d 820, 833 (Utah CtApp.1989) (Jackson,
J., dissenting).
If the issue before us were whether a
specific dollar figure assigned to the "goodwill" of defendant's practice as a separate
asset in that practice was supported by the
evidence at trial, we would be faced with a
more difficult question. However, the trial
court's factual finding was that the value
of defendant's dental practice was $100,000. The court made a comprehensive
finding on value and did not break that
figure down into specific categories, such
as accounts receivable, equipment, or goodwill. In its conclusions of law, the court
stated its "feeling that the large portion of
the value of the practice has to do with
good will and reputation built up in the
practice over the years of marriage." The
court's finding and conclusion are supported by the evidence and are consistent
with the testimony of plaintiffs expert on
dental practice appraisals.
No specific evidence was introduced by
plaintiff on the value of "goodwill" as the
parties use the term in their briefs.1 Goodwill was merely the term used by the trial
court to define that significant part of the
value of the practice not directly attributable to accounts receivable and equipment
and to allude to the reasoning behind its
conclusion that eleven-sixteenths of the
practice was marital property, as discussed
hereafter.
The trial court accepted plaintiffs expert's valuation of zhe dental practice.
This expert relied on a method that valued
the intangible aspects oi a practice by multiplying the annual gross receipts of the
practice by a percentage factor (ranging
from 20 to 100 percent) that took into account such variables as location of the
1. Although plaintiff's attorney and expert used
the word "goodwill" several times in the course
of the testimony on the value of defendant's
practice, that testimony and the appraisal report
admitted into evidence make clear that the term
actually referred generally to all intangible aspects of value, including those discussed below.

p-*

practice, age of accounts receivable, ratio
of accounts payable to gross revenues, age
and condition of equipment, office atmosphere, etc.2 The actual percent of gross
revenues selected depended on these variables and was determined by the appraiser
based on his experience and the information compiled by the dental practice brokerage firm to which plaintiffs expert belonged.
Plaintiffs expert valued defendant's
practice at 34 percent of its gross annual
revenues, plus discounted accounts receivable and equipment value. On cross-examination, the expert testified that this method
of valuation did not break down the value
of the practice, even though accounts receivable and equipment were valued separately. Plaintiffs expert testified that this
was a standard method of valuing dental
practices for sale and opined that most
practices sold for more than 90 percent of
appraised value. This method is not unlike
methods commonly used to value other
types of businesses and even commercial
property.
Credibility of witnesses and valuation of
property are within the trial court's discretion, which this court does not disturb unless it has been abused. See, e.g., Sorensen, 769 P.2d at 823. Defendant has not
shown that the trial court abused its discretion. The majority opinion errs in identifying the issue in this case as an abstract one
of whether the goodwill of a solo professional practice can be a marital asset
Rather, the issue should merely be one of
proof: Did the plaintiff in this case put on
sufficient evidence to support a finding of
value consistent with her theory? The answer is yes. If a plaintiff, using admissible
and reliable evidence, can convince a trial
court that a solo professional practice has a
specific value, then we should uphold that
valuation, whether it includes goodwill or
not If the plaintiffs lawyer does a good
2. Most of these factors are not relevant to goodwill as the term is used in the parties' briefs and
in our cases. See, e.g., Gardner, 748 P.2d at
1080 n. 1.
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job, the plaintiffs case will include goodwill whenever sufficient credible testimony
can be adduced to support it.
In other words, I would hold that business and professional goodwill constitutes
marital property to the extent that market
data establishes a value for it independent of the value of spousal earning capacity, spousal skills, and postmarital
spousal labor. Such a rule should allay
the concerns expressed in the majority
opinion. The majority's blanket prohibition
of any consideration of goodwill as divisible
marital property in any circumstances is
overkill. See Hanson v. Hanson, 738
S.W.2d 429, 433-35 (Mo.1987).
In this case, the record reflects extensive
expert testimony at trial regarding the fact
that there is an economic (salable) value to
the goodwill in this practice. There are
experts who specialize in the sale of solo
professional practices. In fact, this practice was for sale at the time of the divorce,
listed by defendant himself at a price that
included value for goodwill. I think the
majority has overstepped the proper function of this court in substituting its "opinion" that solo practices cannot include value for goodwill in the narrow context of
divorce, when such value is included for all
other purposes and when such value was
supported by expert testimony and the factual findings of the trial court
I concur in all other portions of the majority opinion.
ZIMMERMAN, J., concurs in the
dissenting opinion of DURHAM, J.

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

James Lloyd EMMETT, Defendant
and Appellant
No, 910077.
Supreme Court of Utah.
April 7, 1992.
Rehearing Denied July 7, 1992.
Defendant was convicted in the Fifth
District Court, Washington County, J. Phillip Eves, J., of committing sodomy on his
five-year-old son, and he appealed. The
Supreme Court, Hall, CJ., held that (1)
the failure to make a prompt ruling on the
defendant's motion to dismiss at the close
of the prosecution's case was reversible
error; (2) the prosecutor's remark during
closing argument that the defendant had a
prior forgery conviction, that the victim of
the forgery was defendant's sister, and
that the defendant was, thus, someone who
took advantage of his own family members
was plain error; and (3) errors had occurred during cross-examination although
defendant could not be deemed harmless,
when viewed in context of the other errors.
Reversed and remanded for new trial.
Howe, Associate CJ., dissented with
opinion in which Zimmerman, J., joined.
1. Criminal Law <s=>752%
Defendant was entitled to prompt ruling on his motion to dismiss at close of
prosecution's case. U.C.A.1953, 77-17-3.
2. Criminal Law <3=>1048
Defendant's failure to take exception
when trial court reserved ruling on defendant's motion to dismiss at close of prosecution's case did not waive claim that defendant was denied prompt ruling; defendant raised his motion in timely manner
and gave trial court opportunity to rule on
sufficiency of state's case and to create
adequate record. U.C.A.1953, 77-17-3. -.
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Karen C. MARTINEZ, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
Jess M. MARTINEZ, Defendant
and Petitioner.
No. 880189,
Supreme Court of Utah.
Sept. 16, 1991.

Divorce action was brought. The District Court, Davis County, Rodney S. Page,
J., divorced parties and awarded custody,
child support and alimony and divided property. The wife appealed. The Court of
Appeals, 754 P.2d 69, affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded. Certiorari
was granted. The Supreme Court, Stewart, J., held that Court of Appeals erred in
fashioning remedy in divorce cases called
equitable restitution which could be awarded in addition to alimony, child support, and
property.
Reversed and remanded.
Zimmerman, J., filed a concurring and
dissenting opinion.
Durham, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

1. Divorce <3=>252.3(1)
Court of Appeals erred in fashioning
new remedy in divorce cases called "equitable restitution" which could be awarded
in addition to alimony, child support, and
property; concept oi equitable restitution
was based on proposition that failed marriage was a venture akin to commercial
partnership in which spouses invest time
and effort solely for remunerative activities but marriage is certainly not comparablr to commercial partnership although it is
a i artnership in some respects, and award
of equitable restitution would be extraordinarily speculative.
See publication Words and Phrases for
other judicial constructions and definitions.
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2. Divorce <S=>252.3(1)
Supreme Court does not recognize
property interest in personal characteristics
of another person such as intelligence,
skill, judgment, and temperament, however
characterized, which can be divided upon
divorce.
3. Divorce <3=*237
Alimony award should be determined
by receiving spouse's earning capacity, financial condition, and needs by ability of
other spouse to provide support.
4. Divorce <s=>237
Usually needs of spouses, for purposes
of determining alimony, are assessed in
light of standard of living they had during
marriage and in some circumstances it may
be appropriate to try to equalize spouses'
respective standards of living.
5. Divorce <3=>237, 252.2
When marriage of long duration dissolves on threshold of major change in
income of one spouse due to collective efforts of both, that change, unless unrelated
to efforts put forward by spouses during
marriage, should be given some weight in
fashioning support award; thus, if one
spouse's earning capacity has been greatly
enhanced through efforts of both spouses
during marriage, it may be appropriate for
trial court to make compensating adjustment in dividing marital property and
awarding alimony.

Kent M. Kasting, Kim M. Luhn, Salt
Lake City, for Jess Martinez.
Neil B. Crist, Nelda M. Bishop, Bountiful, for Karen Martinez.
STEWART, Justice:
This case is here on a writ of certiorari to
the Utah Court of Appeals to review the
single issue of whether that court erred in
fashioning a new remedy in divorce cases
which it called equitable restitution and
which may be awarded in addition to alimony, child support, and property. See Martinez v. Martinez, 754 P.2d 69 (Utah Ct
App.1988).
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I. FACTS
Karen and Jess Martinez were married in
1968, while Mr. Martinez was serving in
the United States Army. Both had high
school educations. Mr. Martinez began his
college education in 1970. Three children
were born to the marriage between 1970
and 1975. While an undergraduate student, Mr. Martinez decided to attend medical school, a decision Mrs. Martinez did not
agree with because she thought that medical school would be financially draining and
would limit her husband's ability to spend
time with the family. Nevertheless, Mr.
Martinez entered medical school in 1977
and graduated in 1981. He obtained financial support for his education primarily
from his own earnings, student loans, the
G.I. Bill, and a bequest from his mother's
estate. Mrs. Martinez did not contribute
financially to her husband's medical education.
Karen Martinez filed a complaint for divorce in 1983, and a decree of divorce was
entered in 1985. The trial court found that
Dr. Martinez's gross annual income as a
resident was $100,000 and that "[djuring
fourteen years that the parties lived together, [Mrs. Martinez] assisted extensively in [Dr. Martinez's] obtaining a college
education, medical degree and internship.
In addition, [she] made substantial sacrifices in order to facilitate the completion of
[his] medical schooling and internship."
Mrs. Martinez also earned a very minor
amount of income for a short period which
was used for family expenses.
The trial court awarded Mrs. Martinez
the house the couple had acquired during
the marriage and required her to make the
Dr. Martinez was awarded a lien on that
property in the amount of $17,678, which
represented half the equity in the home.
The court also awarded Mrs. Martinez child
support of $300 per month per child, and
$400 per month alimony for a period of five
years, with the condition that the alimony
terminate after three years if she remarried. Dr. Martinez was ordered to provide
health, accident, and dental insurance for
the children and to maintain a life insur-

B'2.

ance policy on himself for the benefit of the
children. He was also awarded the federal
tax exemptions for two of the children.
The personal property acquired during the
marriage was divided equally. Debts in
the amount of approximately $19,000 for
student loans were assigned to Dr. Martinez. Finally, the court awarded Mrs.
Martinez attorney fees in the amount of
$2,500. The trial court ruled that Dr. Martinez's medical degree and training were
not a marital asset subject to distribution,
but considered his right to practice medicine as it affected his income and ability to
pay alimony and child support.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Mrs.
Martinez contended, inter alia, that the
child support, alimony, and attorney fees
awarded by the trial court were so inadequate as to constitute an abuse of discretion and that the tax exemptions should not
have been awarded to Dr. Martinez. That
court awarded the tax exemptions to Mrs.
Martinez, increased the child support
award to $600 per month per child, and
awarded permanent alimony of $750 per
month. The court affirmed the trial
court's award of only a portion of Mrs.
Martinez's attorney fees. Martinez v.
Martinez, 754 P.2d 69, 72-75 (Utah CtApp.
1988). Relying on its own prior decisions,
the Court of Appeals also held that Dr.
Martinez's medical degree was not marital
property subject to division. See Martinez,
754 P.2d at 75-76; see also Rayburn v.
Rayburn, 738 P.2d 238 (Utah Ct.App.1987);
Petersen v. Petersen, 737 P.2d 237 (Utah
CtApp.1987).
The court concluded, however, that a
means should be devised to compensate
Mr? Martinez for the contribution she had
made to the family. The court stated that
Mrs. Martinez "has earned an award of
some permanent financial benefit, in her
own right, that will allow her to share in
the economic benefits achieved through
their joint efforts" and that Dr. Martinez's
earning capacity "must be recognized in
fashioning those 'legal and equitable remedies' necessary to assist plaintiff to readjust her life." 754 P.2d at 75, 76. Accordingly, the court created a new type of prop-
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erty interest which it called "equitable restitution/' to be awarded Mrs. Martinez in
addition to her interest in the home, alimony, and child support.1 Judge Jackson, in
dissent, concluded that although Mrs. Martinez was entitled to a "generous but fair
distribution of property and award of alimony," the concept of "equitable restitution" was not supportable. 754 P.2d at 82
(Jackson, J., dissenting).
The Court of Appeals listed five factors
for trial courts to consider in determining
when an award of "equitable restitution"
should be made. Those factors are (1) the
length of the marriage, (2) financial contributions and personal development sacrifices made by the spouse requesting equitable restitution, (3) the duration of the
contributions and sacrifices during the
marriage, (4) the disparity in earning capacity between the spouses, and (5) the
amount of property accumulated during
the marriage. 754 P.2d at 78. Although
the court failed to indicate what weight
those factors should be accorded or just
how equitable restitution should be computed, it remanded the case to the trial
court to determine what the amount of
equitable restitution should be.
Dr. Martinez filed a petition for a writ of
certiorari to this Court. We granted the
petition solely on the issue of whether the
Court of Appeals erred in devising "equitable restitution" as a new form of property in divorce cases.
[1] Mrs. Martinez argues that the concept of equitable restitution is justified on
the ground that the remedies available under current law for the distribution of property and the support of a former spouse
are inadequate to provide a fair and equitable result. She contends, in essence,
that a new form of property must be recognized by the courts to provide for a just
and equitable distribution of the increased
earning power which one spouse realizes

from an advanced education acquired during the marriage. The "investment'' referred to by Mrs. Martinez is whatever
effort, support, and sacrifice that is made
by the nonadvantaged spouse. (Hereinafter, we refer to the spouse receiving the
education as the advantaged spouse and
the other spouse as the nonadvantaged
spouse.)
The increased earning capacity of the
advantaged spouse is, according to Mrs.
Martinez, "human capital/' which she measures by the discounted present value of
the projected increased future earnings of
the advantaged spouse during the working
life of that spouse. Mrs. Martinez urges
us to hold that the nonadvantaged spouse
is entitled to financial "reimbursement" for
whatever efforts were made in assisting
the advantaged spouse to obtain an advanced degree, even when wholly nonfinancial. She candidly admits that the purpose
of characterizing that interest as a property interest is to make it a nonterminable
interest, unlike alimony, which ordinarily
terminates upon remarriage. In other
words, the nonadvantaged spouse, even
one who remarries, should benefit for life
by sharing in his or her former spouse's
increased earning capacity.
The Court of Appeals' concept of equitable restitution cannot be sustained for
three reasons. First, the concept of equitable restitution is based on the proposition that a failed marriage is a venture akin
to a commercial partnership in which the
spouses invest their time and effort solely
for remunerative activities. Although marriage is a partnership in some respects, a
marriage is certainly not comparable to a
commercial pannersmp. The efforts each
spouse makes for the other and for their
common marital interests cannot be quantified in monetary terms, their respective
contributions netted out, and a balance
struck at the termination of a marriage.

1. The Court of Appeals purported to rely on this
Court's opinion in Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d
1076 (Utah 1988), as the starting point to devise
the property interest it called "equitable restitution." In Gardner, this Court sidestepped the
issue of whether an advanced degree could be
valued as a marital asset and made subject to

distribution in a property award. We observed
that there were sufficient marital assets in that
case to distinguish it "from others in which
equity and fairness required another solution."
748 P.2d at 1081. That statement, however, did
not contemplate any such thing as "equitable
restitution."
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The very idea of marriage contemplates
mutual effort and mutual sacrifice. Yet, in
this case, Mrs. Martinez would value only
ker contribution to the marriage and not
his. In any event, the spouses' contributions cannot be reduced to a common denominator that allows for a valid compari5on in monetary terms. Indeed, the very
attempt to do so would interfere with the
trial court's ability to achieve an equitable
result based on the needs of the spouses in
light of the monetary resources available.
For example, if a spouse avoids his or her
marital responsibilities, the partnership theory might result in denying that spouse
any award of support or property at divorce, irrespective of his or her need and
the other spouse's ability to pay. That is
not the law.
Second, an award of equitable restitution
would be extraordinarily speculative. Although the Court of Appeals' opinion is
somewhat unclear as to what kind of economic interest it intended to create or just
how it should be computed, it did state,
44
An award of equitable restitution will not
terminate upon plaintiff's remarriage, and
may be payable in lump sum or periodically
over time depending on the circumstances
of each case." 754 P.2d at 78-79. Clearly,
the Court of Appeals contemplated a substantial award.2 Mrs. Martinez asserts
that equitable restitution should be based
on the discounted value of Dr. Martinez's
earnings as a physician over his remaining
working life to age 65, less the amount a
high school graduate would have earned
over the same time. Based on those calculations, Mrs. Martinez values Dr. Martinez's medical education at $1,555,000.3
Although the Court of Appeals did not
specific!!!v adotjt tb's formula for calculat2. The Court of Appeals stated that on remand
the trial court might, for example, extinguish
Dr. Martinez's lien on the family home and
credit that amount against the overall award of
equitable restitution. The court stated that this
amount, $17,528, "would probably be only a
fraction of the total amount of equitable restitution awarded." 754 P.2d at 79 n. 12.
3. Dr. W. Chris Lewis was the expert used by
Mrs. Martinez to place a value on the increased
"income stream" that Dr. Martinez would have
for the remainder of his career. Dr. Lewis had

k'H

ing the amount of equitable restitution,
neither did it reject it or refer to any formula by which the amount of equitable
restitution could be calculated. In any
event, any formula which accomplished
that court's purpose would necessarily be
inherently and highly speculative. If, for
example, a court awarded a lump-sum payment, the award would be based upon a
wholly false assumption if the payor
spouse's working life were cut short by
death, illness, change of profession, or early retirement or if the working life were
interrupted for any other reason. Furthermore, whether a court awarded a lump sum
or periodic payments, the receiving spouse
would be given what is tantamount to a
lifetime estate in the paying spouse's earnings that have no necessary relationship to
the receiving spouse's actual contribution
to the enhanced earning power or to that
spouse's needs, however broadly defined.
Third, although the Court of Appeals
stated that it rejected the proposition that
Dr. Martinez's medical degree should be
valued as a property interest and Mrs. Martinez given an interest in it, that court's
concept of equitable restitution is essentially indistinguishable.
[2] The recipient of an advanced degree
obtains that degree on the basis of his or
her innate personal talents, capabilities,
and acquired skills and knowledge. Such a
degree is highly personal to the recipient
and has none of the traditional characteristics of property. "It does not have an
exchange value or any objective transferable value on an open market. It is personal to the holder. It terminates on death of
the holder and is not inheritable. It cannot
be assiened, sold, transferred, conveved, or
not previously valued a medical degree or medical practice. He calculated the present value of
the lifetime earnings of a healthy 38-year-old
currently earning J 100,000 per year to be
$2,482,500. He then deducted what he thought
an average high school graduate would earn
over the same period of time, or $926,000, and
concluded that the value of Dr. Martinez's
"medical education and training" based on his
increased earning capacity was $1,555,000. On
the basis of that amount, Mrs. Martinez would
be awarded a substantial sum.
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pledged." In re Marriage of Graham, 194
Colo. 429, 432, 574 P.2d 75, 77 (1978). The
time has long since passed when a person's
personal attributes and talents were
thought to be subject to monetary valuation for commercial purposes. In short, we
do not recognize a property interest in personal characteristics of another person
such as intelligence, skill, judgment, and
temperament, however characterized.
The law accepted in other jurisdictions
almost unanimously is that professional degrees are not marital property and are not
subject to equitable distribution. Of twenty-four jurisdictions that have considered
the issue, all but two have held that a
professional degree or license is not marital
property subject to equitable distribution.
See Archer v. Archer, 303 Md. 347, 493
A.2d 1074, 1077 (1985); see also, In re
Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574
P.2d 75 (1978); Grosskopf v. Grosskopf,
677 P.2d 814 (Wyo.1984). See generally
Annotation, Spouse's Professional Degree
or License as Marital Property for Purposes of Alimony, Support, or Property
Settlement, 4 A.L.R.4th 1294 (1981 &
Supp.1990).4 See contra O'Brien v.
O'Brien, 114 Misc.2d 233, 452 N.Y.S.2d 801
(N.Y.Sup.Ct.1982), affd as modified, 66
N.Y.2d 576, 489 N.E.2d 712, 498 N.Y.S.2d
743 (1985) (holding that a professional degree is a marital asset based on a New
York statute unlike Utah's).
[3] Mrs. Martinez's contention that the
remedies provided by Utah Code Ann.
§ 30-3-5 are insufficient is without merit.
Those remedies are adequate to fashion an
appropriate award that meets the standards to be applied in determining awards
of alimony. Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96,
100-01 (Utah 1986); Jones v. Jones, 700
P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985); English v.
English, 565 P.2d 409, 410 (Utah 1977).
An alimony award should be determined by
the receiving spouse's earning capacity, financial condition, and needs and by the
4. See also Albert, Dissolution of Marriage When
One Spouse Holds A Professional Degree—A Call
to Fairness, 36 Drake L.Rev. 1, 3-9 (1986-87)
(explaining why courts should not treat professional degrees as marital property); Comment,
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ability of the other spouse to provide sup.
port. See Jones. 700 P.2d at 1075.
[4,5] Usually the needs of the spouses
are assessed in light of the standard of
living they had during marriage. Gardner
v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1081 (Utah
1988); Jones, 700 P.2d at 1075. In some
circumstances, it may be appropriate to try
to equalize the spouses' respective standards of living. Gardner, 748 P.2d at
1081; see also Olson v. Olson, 704 P.2d
564, 566 (Utah 1985); Higley v. Higley, 676
P.2d 379, 381 (Utah 1983). When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the
threshold of a major change in the income
of one of the spouses due to the collective
efforts of both, that change, unless unrelated to the efforts put forward by the
spouses during marriage, should be given
some weight in fashioning the support
award. Cf Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d
1201, 1205 (Utah 1983). Thus, if one
spouse's earning capacity has been greatly
enhanced through the efforts of both
spouses during the marriage, it may be
appropriate for the trial court to make a
compensating adjustment in dividing the
marital property and awarding alimony.
See, e.g., Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380 (Utah
1980); Tremayne v. Tremayne, 116 Utah
483, 211 P.2d 452 (1949).
Here, the trial court found that the parties would have enjoyed a higher family
income because of Dr. Martinez's increased
income, which was due to some extent to
the efforts of both spouses during the marriage. Although Dr. Martinez earned
$100,000 a year before the parties divorced,
Mrs. Martinez had not enjoyed a higher
standard of living as a result of that increased income. The trial e~ -* awarded
Mrs. Martinez alimony in the amount of
$400 per month for a period of five years.
That amount was nonterminable for a period of three years even if Mrs. Martinez
remarried. The Court of Appeals, relying
upon Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah
1985), modified that award by increasing it
Property Distribution in Domestic Relations Law:
A Proposal for Excluding Educational Degrees
and Professional Licenses From the Marital Estate, 11 Hofstra L.Rev. 1327, 1327-29 (1983).
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to $750 per month subject to the provisions
of Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1987), which
provides for the termination of a permanent alimony award in certain circumstances* That and other modifications
made by the Court of Appeals in favor of
Mrs. Martinez have not been challenged by
either party in this Court.
We granted certiorari solely on the issue
of equitable restitution and denied certiorari on all other issues. We therefore express no opinion on the appropriateness of
the other modifications made by the Court
of Appeals in the divorce decree.
The Court of Appeals' direction to the
trial court to devise an award of equitable
restitution is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in light of this opinion and the
opinion of the Court of Appeals.
HALL, C.J., and HOWE, Associate CJ.,
concur.
ZIMMERMAN, Justice (concurring and
dissenting):
I join Justice Stewart's opinion in its
rejection of the equitable restitution doctrine created by the court of appeals. As
he states, the trial court has ample power
to make alimony and property division
awards which will ensure that equity is
done to a spouse who is denied an increase
in standard of living because a divorce occurs on the threshold of an event that is
economically advantageous to the other
spouse. There is no reason to create a new
and conceptually ill-defined property concept to meet this need.
Justice Durham's dissent deserves some
comment. She suggests that we should
affirm the court of appeals' adoption of an
equitable restitution doctrine because our
existing case law on property division and
alimony is insufficiently flexible to allow
for the fashioning of a remedy for situations of the type presented here. She then
suggests that if we are going to rely upon
property division and alimony law to deal
with these problems, we need to articulate
guidelines for the trial courts in dealing
^ t h this area.

£•4

I disagree with Justice Durham's premise that our cases do not permit the use of
alimony and property division to produce a
fair result in these cases. It may be that
our prior cases have not addressed the
issue, but the opinion Justice Stewart has
authored today does. The majority specifically states:
When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major
change in the income of one of the spouses due to the collective efforts of both,
that change, unless unrelated to the efforts put forward by the spouses during
marriage, should be given some weight
in fashioning the support award.
At 542.
The majority opinion also makes it clear
that the trial court can make such compensating adjustments to both the property
division and the alimony award as it deems
necessary to make the ultimate decision
equitable:
[I]f one spouse's earning capacity has
been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both spouses during the marriage, it may be appropriate for the trial
court to make a compensating adjustment in dividing the marital property and
awarding alimony.
At 542.
In light of this language, joined in by
four members of the court, there can be no
doubt that trial judges are empowered and
enjoined to take circumstances like those
presented here into account in making alimony and property division awards. To
the extent that Justice Durham's opinion
suggests the contrary, it misstates the-law.
As for what appears to be Justice Durham's larger concern—that we have given
the trial courts insufficient guidance as to
how to make the required adjustments in
awards—I agree that over time, we will
have to give further shape to the rules
governing the division of property and the
award of alimony to be sure that both
parties in cases like this one are dealt with
fairly. However, there seems little need to
opt for one theoretical framework now. In
this area, law development on a case-bycase basis may be the best approach. -
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On a separate issue, I dissent from the
majority's remand of this matter to the
trial court. The court of appeals found
that the trial court abused its discretion
and attempted to modify the decree to
make it sufficiently equitable to pass appellate muster. In doing so, the court of
appeals modified the alimony award and
the child support award and ordered equitable restitution. We granted certiorari
to consider only the equitable restitution
portion of that modification of the divorce
decree, and we have now said that in making that specific modification, the court of
appeals overreached. We have not said
that the decree was equitable without some
adjustment that would address the problem
which motivated the creation of the equitable restitution doctrine. We have only
said that the equitable result sought by the
court of appeals cannot be achieved that
way. In fact, the opinion of Justice Stewart recognizes that the trial court had the
power to effect a remedy for the underlying problem.
Under these circumstances, we should
remand the matter to the court of appeals
for further proceedings. It should be allowed to again address the propriety of the
trial court's decree in light of our explication of the law. There is no occasion for us
to send this matter back to the trial court.
If the court of appeals thinks it needs more
information from the trial court, there will
be time enough for such a remand.
DURHAM, Justice dissenting:
The majority opinion holds that professional degrees are not marital properly and
rejects the principle of equitable restitution
fashioned bv the court of appeals, on th*
cneory that currently recognized rights to
alimony, child support, and property distribution are sufficient to solve the complex
problems posed by cases like this. I disagree and would argue that if we are going
to prohibit the use of the principles relied
on by the court of appeals, then we must
fashion a new and more flexible theory of
alimony.
First, there is insufficient tangible property to compensate the spouse who has

been "investing" time, labor, earnings, and
postponed improvements in standard of living for the long-term benefit of the marital
community when the marriage ends before
the investment has "paid off." Second,
child support protects the rights of the
children of divorcing spouses to share m
present and future benefits of earning capacity; it may not legitimately be used to
compensate a former spouse for the value
of what she has "invested" without return
(or lost) as a result of the termmation of
the marriage. Finally, alimony as currently understood in our law is theoretically
inadequate to perform the compensation
function that the court of appeals identified
as necessary in this case. One need only
examine the alimony decisions cited by the
majority opinion to ascertain that alimony
in this state has depended on (1) the financial conditions and needs of the recipient
spouse, (2) the ability of the recipient
spouse to produce sufficient income for
self-support, and (3) the ability of the payor
spouse to provide support. See, e.g., Jones
v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985).
To those fundamental principles, we have
added the consideration that "[a]n alimony
award should, in as far as possible, equalize the parties' respective standards of living and maintain them at a level as close as
possible to the standard of living enjoyed
during the marriage"
Higley v. Higley,
676 P.2d 379, 381 (Utah 1983) (emphasis
added).
I submit that none of the foregoing principles address the specific problem posed
by termination of a marriage in which one
or both spouses have sacrificed in tangible
and intangible ways, foregoing income, accumulation of property, an enhanced stanJu^J o^ .I'iiis, c ^ che educational and career-development opportunities of one so
that the other might acquire a valuable and
prestigious professional degree. When the
marriage ends before the marital community has enjoyed the benefits expected from
that sacrifice, the nonholder of the degree
suffers a very real loss. Whether we
adopt a doctrine of "equitable restitution"
or rethink the theory and function of alimony, we must address the requirements of
equity and justice to compensate in some
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fashion for that loss. As David S. Dolowjtz recently noted in the Utah Bar Journal equitable restitution is a form of alimony "paid to produce an equitable balancing of property and income that cannot
be otherwise effected" by the traditional
forms of support alimony and rehabilitative
alimony. Dolowitz, The Impact of Tax
laws on Divorce, Utah B.J., at 8, 9 (August/September 1991) (emphasis added).
Other commentators have recently devoted a great deal of scholarly attention to the
problems of compensating spouses for losses they suffer because of decisions to further the marital enterprise by enhancing
the education or career of one spouse at
cost to both.1 In a recent article discussing
the question Should "The Theory of Alimony" Include Nonfinancial Losses and
Motivations?, 1991 B.Y.U.L.Rev. 259, law
professor Ira Ellman (author of The Theory of Alimony, 77 Calif.L.Rev. 1 (1989))
observes:
[Fjhe purpose of alimony under "The
Theory" is to eliminate the financial disincentives for marital sharing behavior
that would be present in the absence of a
remedy, rather than to provide positive
incentives
The principle is actually
rather modest in scope. The policy upon
which it is based would seem, at least at
first, to be broadly acceptable: spouses
otherwise inclined to conduct themselves
during the marriage in a manner that
benefits the marital community ought
not be discouraged from acting that way
for fear that, if the marriage were to
dissolve, they would be left with all of
the financial loss arising from their decision. This is especially true when, for
example, the wife has a loss while her
husband has no loss, or even reaps a gain
(as would be the case where the wife
gives up her employment to advance her
husband's).
B.Y.U.L.Rev. at 265.
This approach is connected to an assessment of loss, not one of need, as has traditionally been the case in the theory of

alimony. It requires the courts to discover
or create means by which a spouse may
recover after divorce the value of what he
or she lost by reason of investment in the
marital enterprise, where that investment
has resulted in a net gain to the other
spouse.
Once the spouses' gain or loss from
the marriage has been measured, they
can be compared against one another to
determine if one spouse has a loss that
should be reallocated to the other.
Clearly all losses cannot be compensable,
for the simple reason that the claim is
against the other spouse, and both spouses may have suffered a loss from their
marriage. A loss is compensable, in
whole or part, only if the other spouse's
loss is smaller, or if the other spouse has
achieved a gain.
Id. at 271. Professor Ellman goes on to
describe this as a "reliance measure" of
loss, as opposed to the traditional contract
damage measure of expectation, and explains its justification at some length. He
also suggests several important limitations
on his theory of alimony: for example, (1)
only residual post-marriage losses are compensable, not inequities in the exchange
during marriage; (2) only financial losses
are compensable; and (3) only losses arising from marital "sharing behavior" are
compensable.
I do not propose that we adopt Professor
Ellman's theory wholesale; I only cite it as
one example of a thoughtful effort to solve
the problems posed by the common circumstances illustrated in this case. My criticism of the majority opinion is that it
makes no effort to guide the trial courts in
fashioning a realistic remedy for what is a
realistic loss. It rejects the effort of the
court of appeals to do precisely that and
offers no alternative. The legal status quo
is unacceptable, in my view, and I hope
that the majority will be willing in the
future to make good on its representation
that the concept of alimony (or property
distribution when there is any property)
can be accommodated to the need for equi-

1- See Batts, Remedy Refocus: In Search of Equity in "Enhanced Spouse/Other Spouse"Divorces,
63 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 751 (1988); Shelburn & Chas-
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tain, Career Assets and the Equitable Apportionment of Marital Property, 38 S.C. L.Rev. 755
(1987).
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ty. Unless and until that happens, any
woman (or man, for that matter) who sacrifices her own education, earning capacity,
or career development so that a spouse
may advance and the marriage may prosper as a joint venture will inevitably suffer
the full cost of that decision at divorce,
while the advantaged spouse will continue
to walk away from the marriage with all of
the major financial gain. That is unfair,
and in this area at least, the responsibility
of the law is to seek fairness.

Raymond P.L. CANNEFAX and
Debra Cannefax, Plaintiffs
and Respondents,
v.
Donald W. CLEMENT and Ruth
Lu Clement, Defendants and
Petitioners,
No. 900084.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Sept. 30, 1991.
Purchasers who had acquired property
from contract vendee brought quiet title
action against contract vendors' creditors.
The Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
Pat B. Brian, J., rendered summary judgment in favor of creditors and purchasers
appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed
with direction, 786 P.2d 1377. On certiorari,
the Supreme Court, Stewart, J., held that
vendors' interest in property subject to executory real estate contract was not "real
property" for purposes of judgment lien
statute.
Affirmed.
1. Judgment <3=>780(3)
Vendors' interest in property subject
to executory real estate contract was not

"real property" for purposes of judgment
lien statute and, thus, judgment docketed
against vendors after contract was entered
into did not create lien against vendors'
interest m property. U.C.A.1953, 78-22-1.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
2. Judgment e=793(l)
Judgment lien which has already attached to real property will not be destroyed by subsequent conveyance of property.
Rodney M. Pipella, Valden P. Livingston,
Salt Lake City, for Raymond P.L. and Debra Cannefax.
Steven H. Lybbert, Salt Lake City, for
Donald and Ruth Clement.
Michael W. Homer, David R. Olsen, Salt
Lake City, for amicus Utah Land Title
Ass'n.
STEWART, Justice:
This case is here on certiorari from a
decision of the Utah Court of Appeals
which reversed a summary judgment entered by the trial court in favor of Donald
and Ruth Clement Donald and Ruth
Clement are judgment creditors of George
and Lila Barker, vendors of land under a
uniform real estate contract. The issue
before the Court is one of first impression:
whether a vendor's interest in real property
sold by a land sale contract is transformed
by the doctrine of equitable conversion into
personal property and therefore not subject
to a judgment lien pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-22-1 (1987). We hold that a
judgment against the vendor of land under
a land sale contract does not create a lien
against a vendor's interest for purposes of
§ 78-22-1.
On August 28, 1981, pursuant to a uniform real estate contract, George and Lila
Barker contracted to sell certain real property which they owned in fee simple to
Diane Hodge. Ms. Hodge recorded notice
of that contract on August 31, 1981. The
defendants, Donald W. Clement and Ruth

